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ABSTRACT

1.

A graph-based method is proposed for inferring similarities
among companies from their affiliations in the context of
expenditure financial transactions in the Brazilian Federal
Government. There are trusted and untrusted companies.
We performed a basic cluster analysis in the companies network to verify whether clusters (connected components) are
discriminative concerning companies trustworthiness. Results show evidences that this is true, reinforcing the following hypotheses: (1) there are suppliers associations, which
evidences the formation of cartels; and (2) public agencies
and agents play an important role in the legality of financial
transactions.

Corporate scandals and the corruption of public officers
are recurrent issues in the Brazilian media. These situations
have been described as very negative things, unwanted, but
difficult to avoid.
There are groups that advocate the existence of capacity
within public governance and regulation systems to identify and correct problematic situations. Although the institutions are basically well established, there is a growing
perception, reinforced by recurrent news, that the scandals
reveal the existence of a structural deficit in public governance, which would represent a threat to the political system
as a whole. In fact, the perception that the procurement is
dominated by supplier associations acting under economic,
fiscal, criminal and political infringing conduct is common
sense understanding. There is no numeric confirmation to
measure the real size of the problem. Nevertheless, it is the
lack of awareness of the extent of socio-political and administrative phenomena that allow us to establish the existence
of accountability deficit, which inhibits government responsiveness.
The “bureaucratic machine” has difficulty to see the accountability mechanisms as something that help the government,
and not as an additional burden inside its routines. However, corruption is contingent and contexts change. The
adequacy of the state public functions presupposes not only
the ”rule of law”, but, above all, the recognition of the dynamics of changes, which define an underlying evolutionary
process. Typically, this process is supplied by unexpected
events which are sometimes difficult to understand and explain [1]. It leads to the necessity of supplying management
accountability means. Some of those means are data discovery techniques.
This text proposes the initial examination of the cartel formation issue by Brazilian government suppliers as a case
study in experimental computing [2]. The study has an economic interpretation, but this work is mainly an exercise of
data science, more specifically about data science process
in this emerging subject which is related to the problem of
hypotheses formulation on regulatory activities. A plausible
hypothesis must be known in order to support the decision
whether to continue or to terminate a research line. Also,
the study must be agile enough so that the effort that pre-
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cedes the decision does not imply in a waste of resources.
The presupposition assumed, based on the “theory of evolutionary governance” [3], is that the critical phenomena for
public governance are emergent, with probabilistic behavior with an underlying structure, typical of complex systems. Unveiling this structure is a prerequisite for the understanding of the problem that involves relationships between agents. In this case, the analysis, based on complex
networks, is possible [4], and can be imposed as necessary,
according to the relationships that are established in such
problems. The case study initially identifies the validity of
spending resources to deepen the understanding of government procurement and its “pathologies”. Additionally, it
allows giving insights about the generalization of complex
networks approach for studies on regulation.

2.

HYPOTHESES FORMULATION
PROBLEM

Investigations regarding the regularity of transactions between business and government are an old and recurring
theme. George Stigler, co-authored with Claire Friedland,
coined the term “regulatory capture” [5] as he started a series
of studies about the ineffectiveness of State activity based
on regulation. These studies showed how the corporations
would act to reverse the State regulatory bodies control interface. Although it was not his first goal, his studies raised
important issues concerning public transparency, violated
due to the influence of the external agent to give rise to regulatory sharing of public interest information formatted in
selected information from publications and not representative of the control action. He described, in this way, the most
basic way to produce gaps in accountability mechanisms. Although the studies were focused on regulatory agencies, the
control problem is similar when transposed to the government procurement context.
The Society is developing a new perception towards the necessity of transparency as a requirement to proceeding on
the public sphere, whether governments, companies or individuals. Thus, it seeks to improve the definition of the
boundaries between the public and the private area, as a
means of preserving privacy in the private sphere. A wide
regulation has been built over the years, defining criteria for
public and corporate governance. The goal has been to define ways to influence the behavior of organizational systems
for the benefit of public governance.
Human societies, organizations and individuals are typically
organized into networks. There are in such networks induction control structures which are not random and reveal
models of fundamental structures [6]. According to the authors, real networking profiles provide information about the
high-level organization and show a strong correlation with
certain control properties. This type of observation leads to
the fact that effective regulation requires the identification
of the actual network structure. The problem, in case it
happens, comes from the fact that the institutional framework of each country is unique, unfolding as following: (a)
the quality of the data depends on the informational potential of accountability mechanisms; (b) analysis methods of
complex network depend on the information structure [7].
For some situations it is necessary to define a strategy of
analysis, and identifying if the study under such strategy
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is viable, as soon as possible, before spending unnecessary
effort, and only then to conclude about the feasibility of the
task. The hypotheses formulation problem is a creative process, rather than the art with digital investigations [9]. It
is necessary to formulate multiple “occurrence hypotheses”.
Some occurrence hypotheses are supported on preliminary
experimental evidences, which justify the choice of assumptions and established correlations made with the theories,
not requiring logical consistency.
This work aims at developing the research from first occurrence hypotheses. This is established as the first step of the
identification of the complex structure of the government
purchases network, from the available data. The first issue
of the hypothesis formulation process is the identification of
topological elements of the control structure. It refers to
these questions: (a) do suppliers act alone? (b) are there
associations of suppliers? (c) is there a large syndicate of
crime? (d) are they hierarchical? Thus, the formulation
of hypotheses need to be preceded by a kind of data validation, a situation frequently found in data mining. Such
validation requires obtaining experimental evidence, which
usually is not a trivial task.

3.

TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK

A graph-based method is proposed for inferring similarities among companies from their affiliations in the context
of expenditure financial transactions in the Brazilian Federal
Government. Affiliations are interpreted as direct payments
(from government offices to companies) and payment cards
(from authorized people to companies) transactions. The
proposed generative method aims to produce an acceptable
approximation of the real world companies similarity network with edges representing probabilities of similar behavior.
As one can see, non-tecnhical motivation of this study is
closely related to investigation of financial fraud (e.g. misappropriation of money, money laundering) involving public
funds. In such scenarios, similarity among untrusted agents
is important. Although this approach is far from being a
potential source of evidence of companies involvement in financial crime, it could provide a strongly reduced sample to
start investigations by identifying behaviors that are similar
to those of admittedly untrusted agents.
Expenditure data are available in the Federal Government
transparency Web portal1 . This work is particularly aimed
at direct expenditures and financial transfers. Direct expenditures include government-to-companies payments and
federal government payment card (FGPC) usage. There are
kinds of transfers which are resources moved from federal
government to states, cities or companies, but for the purpose of this work, only the usage of civil defense payment
card (CDPC) is included. Untrusted agents data are also
available in the portal, and include suspended untrusted
(for-profit and nonprofit) companies and expelled public employees, from which we used only the database of untrusted
companies.
Expenditure data allow to interpret the following possible
connections:
• Government office to company: connection weighted
with the total amount of money paid by the govern1

Web address: http://www.transparencia.gov.br
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ment office to the company along the following period
of time: 2011–2014.
• Individual to company: connection weighted with
the total amount of money paid by the individual (FGPC
or CDPC) to the company along the following period
of time: 2010–2014.
Government offices and individuals are interpreted as affiliations. The research hypothesis is that a similarity network
of companies can be inferred from their shared affiliations
and connections weights, and actual similar companies are
in the same connected component in the graph. An initial
graph that mixes companies, people and government offices
is generated and then a final graph of companies connections
is inferred.
To validate the mentioned hypothesis, we investigated whether
clusters formed by companies connections are sensitive to
trustworthiness of companies. Results show evidences that
trusted companies behave similarly, as well as untrusted
ones, since homogeneity of connected components is high.

4.

METHOD AND COMPANIES NETWORK
GENERATIVE MODEL

Target network is formed by companies as nodes and similarity probabilities among companies (connections) as weighted
edges. A variation of Jaccard similarity coefficient [8] was
used. The original Jaccard index applied to nodes a and b
of a graph could be defined according to equation 1.
J(a, b) =

|Na ∩ Nb |
|Na ∪ Nb |

(1)

Where Na and Nb are neighbors of nodes a and b, respectively.
The proposed variation states that the intersection between
a and b is weighted by the similarity of connection values
of nodes a and b with their shared neighbors. For example, if nodes a and b share a neighbor c, then the similarity
between connections (a, c) and (b, c) is given by equation 2.
|w(a,c) − w(b,c) |
s((a, c), (b, c)) = 1 −
max(w(a,c) , w(b,c) )

(2)

Where w(a,c) and w(b,c) are weights of (a, c) and (b, c), respectively.
When (a, c) and (b, c) are equal and positive, the sub-expression
|w(a,c) − w(b,c) | is equal to 0. In this case, similarity between
connections is 1. On the other hand when w(a,c) and w(b,c)
are different and positive, similarity is proportional to difference, considering values magnitude, since this difference
is normalized by the higher value (max(w(a,c) , w(b,c) )).
The complete intersection between nodes a and b, S(a, b),
is therefore the sum of connections similarities with shared
neighbors. This is captured by equation 3.
P
i∈Na ∩Nb s((a, i), (b, i))
(3)
S(a, b) =
|Na ∪ Nb |
P
The maximum value of i∈Na ∩Nb s((a, i), (b, i)) is |Na ∩Nb |.
This happens when weights of all shared connections of a
and b are equal, so in this case equation 3 behaves as the
original Jaccard similarity (equation 1).
Using equation 3 a network of companies is built from their
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affiliations, that is, valued relations with government offices
and employees.

5.

EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

Connections among companies indicate degrees of similarity (]0.0, 1.0]) regarding valued services provided to government offices and employees. Connections with weight 0.0
and companies with no connections were not included in
the initial graph. We defined the σ parameter as an inferior threshold for removal of edges in the initial graph to
produce the final one. This means that only nodes with
weights greater than or equal to σ were kept in the final
companies’ network. No social network analysis [7] centrality metric, such as nodes and edges betweenness and nodes
degrees, were used to increase clustering coefficient.
There are trusted and untrusted companies. We hypothesize that trusted companies have similar behavior among
themselves, as well as the untrusted ones. In terms of the
generated graphs and according to the mentioned hypothesis, clusters (here connected components) must be uniform
regarding the presence of trusted and untrusted companies.
That is, it is expected the existence of clusters formed almost entirely by trusted companies and clusters formed almost entirely by untrusted companies. This hypothesis is
here called the homogeneity hypothesis.
We experimented four values of σ: 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0.
For information, a connection between two companies with
weight 1.0 means that they behave perfectly equal, while
weights more and more close to 0.0 imply to less similarity
between companies.
Below there is some information about the graph for σ =
0.25:
• Number of companies: 7377
• Number of connections: 409796
• Average degree: 111.1010
• Number of connected components: 524
• Number of untrusted companies: 324
Figure 1 shows companies and their connections for σ =
0.25. Companies are nodes and connections are edges. Trusted
companies are blue nodes, while untrusted companies are
red. It turns out that, as stated by the homogeneity hypothesis, clusters are almost entirely uniform regarding trustworthiness of companies.
Below there is some information about the graph for σ =
0.5:
• Number of companies: 6576
• Number of connections: 304773
• Average degree: 92.6925
• Number of connected components: 716
• Number of untrusted companies: 138
Figure 2 shows companies and their connections for σ =
0.5. Homogeneity hypothesis is again visually evidenced,
besides strong classes (trusted and untrusted) unbalancing.
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Figure 1: Network of trusted (blue) and untrusted (red) companies for σ = 0.25.

Figure 2: Network of trusted (blue) and untrusted (red) companies for σ = 0.5.
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Same visual results for σ = 0.75 (figure 3) and σ = 1.0
(figure 4) in more extreme class balancing conditions.
Below there is some information about the graph for σ =
0.75:
• Number of companies: 5773
• Number of connections: 215294
• Average degree: 74.5865
• Number of connected components: 780
• Number of untrusted companies: 82
Below there is some information about the graph for σ =
1.0:
• Number of companies: 2190
• Number of connections: 121464

Despite the lack of strong statistical rigor, preliminary
results and visual inspection show evidences that the generated models produced clusters (connected components) that
are discriminative to trustworthiness of companies. Such
discriminative clusters topology reinforces the hypothesis
that there are suppliers associations, which evidences the
formation of cartels. Furthermore, affiliation-based clustering reinforces the hypothesis that public agencies and agents
could play an important role in establishing the legality of
financial transactions. The study leads to the next steps of
investigation.
Finally, since the interpretation of affiliation and derived
probability of “friendship” are domain specific – in this case,
the Brazilian Federal Government expenditure financial transactions –, this work could be generalized with adaptations.
The same research methodology can be reused to produce
valid methods for other domains.

7.

• Average degree: 110.9260
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Table 1: Classification performance results.

6.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This is a preliminary work that proposes a generative
model for inferring companies similarity networks based on
Government expenditures data.
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Figure 3: Network of trusted (blue) and untrusted (red) companies for σ = 0.75.

Figure 4: Network of trusted (blue) and untrusted (red) companies for σ = 1.0.
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